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THE SCIENCE OF SUBSTITUTION:  
A RESPONSE TO CARRIER AND MINNITI 
 
Jacob S. Sherkow* 
  In Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, Michael A. Carrier and Carl 
J. Minniti provide an overview of potential antitrust harms in the newly enacted 
biologic drug approval and litigation regime, the Biologics Price Competition 
and Innovation Act. Importantly, Carrier and Minniti suggest that the scientific 
complexity of biologic products has the potential to make some litigation con-
duct anticompetitive, given uncertainties surrounding regulatory approval and 
patent infringement. This response advances Carrier and Minniti’s thesis and 
suggests the authors do not take it far enough when assessing reverse payment 
settlements, submarine patenting, and citizen petition abuse. This response also 
makes use of two important court decisions, Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. and 
Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, which were decided after Carrier and Minniti’s article 
went to press. Regardless of whether Carrier and Minniti’s predictions come to 
pass, their core insight—that scientific complexity can regulate antitrust 
harms—provides a key area of future exploration for practitioners, scholars, 
and policy makers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, Michael A. Carrier and Carl J. 
Minniti provide a thoroughly exhaustive overview of all of the possible ways 
the recent biologic drug approval regime—the Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act (“BPCIA”)—could be subject to the same anticompetitive con-
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duct found in the small-molecule drug approval regime—the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.1 Specifically, they provide assessments of reverse-payment settlements, 
product hopping, submarine patenting, specious REMS restrictions, citizen-
petition abuse, competitor disparagement, and collusion.2 This detailed catalog-
ing of the antitrust harms for life-science patent litigation is an achievement and 
should be of significant practical value to scholars and practitioners. 
But Carrier and Minniti’s synthesis goes further: it highlights the legal 
significance of the scientific differences between biologics and small molecule 
drugs. Biologics are inordinately more complex than small-molecule drugs—
more difficult to manufacture, protected by more patents, governed by a more 
complex regulatory regime, and less likely to be interchangeable with their ge-
neric rivals, biosimilars.3 These differences undergird the basis for Carrier and 
Minniti’s conclusions that “conduct like submarine patents, shell licensing, re-
verse-payment settlements, disparagement, sample denials, and collusion” 
threaten the BPCIA’s purposes and that “the industry’s science and markets . . .	
justifies many citizen petitions and makes product hopping and settlements less 
likely.”4 
This essay furthers Carrier and Minniti’s insight that the scientific com-
plexity of a product can turn otherwise anticompetitive behavior into procom-
petitive or neutrally competitive conduct. In the biologics context, the scientific 
complexity of biologics, in conjunction with a regulatory approval regime that 
takes such complexity into account, makes many biosimilars not true economic 
substitutes for their reference biologics.5 Without true substitutability, conduct 
that would initially appear collusive or anti-competitive may be procompetitive 
 
 1.  Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 
1, 14. It is important to note that the BPCIA is not the first regulatory approval regime for biologics; that honor 
goes to the 1902 Biologics Control Act, one of the progenitor statutes that eventually led to the creation of the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. Ann. 728, ch. 1378 (1902). Rather, the 
BPCIA is merely a new regulatory regime (albeit, an important one) in a long line of prior regulatory regimes 
for biologics. See Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price Competi-
tion and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 681–88 (2010) (recounting the history of biologics 
control in the United States). 
 2. See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 1, at 20–73. 
 3. Id. at 7–9; see also Janet Freilich, Patent Infringement in the Context of Follow-On Biologics, 16 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9, 21–22 (2012) (discussing the lack of interchangeability for biologics); W. Nicholson 
Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologic Competition and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
1023, 1028 (2016) (“[M]any complex biologic products cannot be fully characterized by current techniques for 
analyzing the end product. Moreover, slight variations in the manufacturing process can change the quality, 
safety, or efficacy of the final product.”) (internal citations omitted); W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secre-
cy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1794–99 (2016) (analyzing trade secrecy for biologics). 
 4.  Carrier & Minniti, supra note 1, at 74. 
 5.  See Henry G. Grabowski et al., Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 MANAGERIAL & 
DECISION ECON. 439, 449 (2007) (noting the imperfect substitutability of a “follow-on protein product”); Henry 
Grabowski et al., The Market For Follow-On Biologics: How Will It Evolve?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1291, 1298 
(2006) (noting that the biosimilars lack perfect substitutability, and this may contribute to price uncertainty); 
Darren S. Tucker & Gregory F. Wells, Emerging Competition Issues Involving Follow-on Biologics, 
ANTITRUST, Fall 2014, at 102 (“When [biosimilars] are available, less substitution away from the reference 
biologic is expected than for branded pharmaceuticals.”). 
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or, at base, within the scope of the patent right.6 This essay also makes use of 
two important court decisions decided after Carrier and Minniti’s article went 
to press: Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., which limited the availability of injunc-
tions in BPCIA litigation,7 and Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, which narrowed the avail-
ability of patents covering antibodies, the staple molecule of biologic drugs.8 
Assessing this connection between biologics’ complexity and substitutability 
may require some more careful thinking about some of Carrier and Minniti’s 
conclusions concerning reverse payment settlements, submarine patenting, and 
citizen petitions. 
I. REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
Carrier is—without equal—the leading scholar on the antitrust concerns 
raised by reverse-payment settlements, and much of scholars’ and practitioners’ 
understanding of these agreements is based on Carrier’s work.9 In Carrier and 
Minniti’s recent description, “[t]he typical arrangement . . .	 involves a brand 
paying a generic to settle patent litigation and delay entering the market.”10 
Since the patent holder otherwise has the right to prohibit infringing conduct 
during the duration of the patent term, such an arrangement—at first blush—
would appear to be procompetitive:   so long as the generic enters the market 
prior to the patent’s expiration, competition seems to increase.11 But in 2013, 
the Supreme Court in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. concluded that “[b]ecause the set-
tlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged infringer, rather than the other 
way around, this kind of settlement . . .	can sometimes unreasonably diminish 
competition in violation of the antitrust laws.”12 The key component to anti-
competitive conduct under Actavis is “payment” that “payment constituted the 
anticompetitive harm and that even strong patents were not immune from scru-
tiny.”13 
Carrier and Minniti think that such settlements under the BPCIA are un-
likely for both economic and legal reasons: Reference biologics’ first-mover 
advantage and the lack of price erosion diminish the value of reverse payment 
 
 6. See Charles F. Rule, The Administration’s Views: Antitrust Analysis After the Nine No-No’s, 55 
ANTITRUST L.J. 365, 369 (1986) (“The antitrust laws, however, only condemn patent licensing that either re-
stricts competition among technologies that are economic substitutes, or excludes new technologies from the 
market, or is a sham designed to coordinate the pricing of products only remotely related to the patent.”). 
 7.  137 S. Ct. 1664, 1674–78 (2017). 
 8. 872 F.3d 1367, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 9.  See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 13 (2014) (defining “pay-
ment” for reverse-payment settlement analysis); Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A 
Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 73–76 (2009) (plotting antitrust analyses for dif-
ferent reverse payment settlements); Michael A. Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the 
Drug Patent Settlement Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 5–8 (2012) (criticizing earlier courts’ “scope of 
the patent test” for reverse payment settlements). 
 10.  Carrier & Minniti, supra note 1, at 21. 
 11.  See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013) (describing the reasoning of several Eleventh 
Circuit cases). 
 12.  Id. at 2227. 
 13.  Carrier, Payment After Actavis, supra note 9, at 19. 
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settlements, and the increased availability of patent challenges at the U.S. Pa-
tent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) in the form of inter partes review make 
such settlements impractical.14 Nonetheless, Carrier and Minniti caution against 
certain payments between reference biologics and biosimilars, including “bio-
similar’s access to a biologic’s distribution or reimbursement agreements” such 
as access to group purchasing organizations (“GPOs”) or pharmacy benefit 
managers (“PBMs”) through which a reference biologic is sold.15 
But the science and regulatory complexity of biologics make it unclear 
whether such benefits constitute impermissible “payments” under Actavis. Un-
der Carrier’s prior helpful distinction between anticompetitive payments and 
permissible patent exclusion, payments are “a type of consideration not availa-
ble as a direct consequence of winning the lawsuit.”16 While it is true that ac-
cess to a reference biologic’s distribution network would not be available as a 
remedy for a biosimilar’s successful patent lawsuit, it does not appear that such 
agreements would be anticompetitive. To the contrary, it seems to be the case 
that access agreements—even when nominally “large payments,” thus raising 
Actavis’s scrutiny—would be procompetitive. 
Absent access agreements, biosimilars face significant distributional chal-
lenges “such as prescriber and patient education, consumer reluctance,” pricing 
uncertainties, and a lack of interchangeability between the biosimilar and the 
reference biologic.17 Indeed, this latter concern—interchangeability—drives 
much of newly approved biosimilars distributional difficulties.18 In the small-
molecular context, true generics are widely interchangeable with one another 
and the reference listed drug.19 This generally creates a unified, competitive 
market: Given a single prescription, payers can choose, at the point of sale, 
which manufacturer’s product it will purchase.20 
But biosimilars are not automatically interchangeable; the scientific com-
plexity of biologics and the BPCIA’s provisions make it so.21 The manufacture 
 
 14. Carrier & Minniti, supra note 1, at 23–24. 
 15. Id. at 27. 
 16. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, supra note 9, at 16. 
 17. Carrier & Minniti, supra note 1, at 23; see also Grabowski et al., supra note 5, at 1298. 
 18.  See Alfred B. Engelberg et al., Balancing Innovation, Access, and Profits—Market Exclusivity for 
Biologics, 361 N. ENG. J. MED. 1917, 1918 (2009) (“If biosimilar products are not similarly interchangeable 
with the original biologic product, they could not be substituted for the original and would have to be marketed 
to physicians as therapeutic alternatives. The cost of deploying a promotional program and sales force for this 
purpose would inevitably limit the number of potential market entrants and increase drug costs.”), http://www. 
nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0908496#t=article; Ameet Sarpatwari et al., Progress and Hurdles for Fol-
low-On Biologics, 372 N. ENG. J. MED. 2380, 2381–82 (2015) (“[H]eightened barriers to substitution are likely 
to reduce the market penetration of interchangeable biologics.”), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJM 
p1504672#t=article. [CC: these are consecutively paginated journals under R16, I do not believe they need 
links] 
 19.  Sarpatwari et al., supra note 18, at 2381. 
 20. Greg Perry, The European Generic Pharmaceutical Market in Review: 2006 and Beyond, 4 J. 
GENERIC MED. 1, 13 (2006) (“American generics companies . . . benefit from a large, unified market fortified 
by a strong legal and commercial environment designed to favour generic medicines competition. . . . .”). 
 21. Paul J. Declerck, Biotherapeutics in the Era of Biosimilars: What Really Matters is Patient Safety, 30 
DRUG SAFETY 1087, 1089 (2007) (“As a consequence of the complexity of both the biotechnology product and 
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of biologics is inordinately complex and poses safety and efficacy risks not typ-
ically encountered in the small-molecular context.22 The BPCIA therefore re-
quires biosimilars to affirmatively demonstrate interchangeability through low-
product complexity, low-immunogenicity risk, or switching studies—none of 
which a biosimilar applicant has accomplished to date.23 Even then, because 
prescriber substitution is a state-law concern, only some states would even al-
low substitutability.24 Thus, contrary to their name, most biosimilars are not 
truly substitutes for their reference biologics. 
On the ground, the markets for biosimilars and their reference biologics 
are badly balkanized. GPOs and PBMs control access to manufacturer-specific 
biologic products,25 and consumers are therefore frequently subject to a single 
choice, independent of typical market levers, such as price, quantity, quality, or 
preference.26 Further, consumers are unlikely to have any choice in these built-
in supply controls. For example, a cancer patient and filigrastim scrip holder 
who obtains health insurance through an employer-sponsored health insurance 
plan may be required, through the plan’s PBM, to receive Amgen’s Neupogen 
and not Sandoz’s biosimilar product—even if the latter is cheaper or more 
widely distributed through the patient’s healthcare provider network. Obtaining 
the biosimilar may require drastic action: changing health insurers by changing 
employers.27 
This intersection of the scientific and regulatory complexity of biosimilars 
suggests that patent settlements that allow access to biologics’ markets allow 
competition among manufacturers that would not otherwise exist. Thus, even 
though such settlements appear to constitute “large payments” under both Car-
rier and Minniti’s framework, as well as Actavis’s analysis, they are almost cer-
tain to be procompetitive. The counterargument is that such agreements should 
be balanced with the concomitant delay to the biosimilars’ entry.28 But, even if 
a biosimilar won its patent suit against the reference biologic, it would not be 
 
the production process  . . . no solid scientific grounds exist to guarantee safe interchangeability between any 
biologics . . . .”); Janet Freilich, Patent Infringement in the Context of Follow-On Biologics, 16 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 9, 21–24 (2012) (citing Declerck). 
 22.  Declerk, supra note 21, at 1088 (noting differences in manufacturing biologics in cells). 
 23.  42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(3) (2012); Zachary Brennan, Interchangeable Biosimilars vs. Biosimilars: Experts 
Explain Guidance, Discuss Development and Uptake, REG. FOCUS (Sept. 13, 2017), http://www.raps. 
org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2017/09/13/28460/Interchangeable-Biosimilars-vs-Biosimilars-Experts-Explain-
Guidance-Discuss-Development-and-Uptake/ (“To date, six biosimilars have been approved in the US, though 
none are interchangeable biosimilars.”). 
 24. Erika Lietzan, The Uncharted Waters of Competition and Innovation in Biological Medicines, 44 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 26–27 (forthcoming 2018) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2848606). 
 25. See Andrew W. Mulcahy et al., BIOSIMILAR COST SAVINGS IN THE UNITED STATES, RAND CORP. 
(2017), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE264/RAND_PE264.pdf (“[O]ne 
major PBM, Express Scripts, recently listed Zarxio® and Granix®, but not Neupogen® (the reference biologic 
for Zarxio®), on its 2018 National Preferred Formulary, while another large PBM, CVS Caremark, restricted 
coverage of Neupogen® in July 2017.”). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Carrier & Minniti, supra note 1, at 22–28. 
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clear the biosimilar would have anywhere to sell its product. It is entirely feasi-
ble that even a complete biosimilar victory would make no difference in the 
competitive landscape. Carrier and Minniti are right that the science and regula-
tion of biologics raises different concerns over reverse payments than do small-
molecule drugs. But they do not appear to go far enough to recognize that these 
differences mean that any agreement that allows biosimilar market access is 
likely a competitive improvement. 
II.  SUBMARINE PATENTING 
Carrier and Minniti also raise concerns over “submarine patenting,” a pa-
tent “applicant’s use of silent delay tactics at the PTO, aimed at obtaining issu-
ance of a patent years after the initial filing, but still with the legal right to sur-
prise a mature market.”29 While Carrier and Minniti rightly note that such 
tactics have largely disappeared since 1995—when patent terms shifted from 
seventeen years from issuance to twenty years from the date of filing—they 
provide areas of the BPCIA that may continue to provide areas of abuse. They 
note that the BPCIA appears to allow reference biologics to seek preliminary 
injunctions against their biosimilar competitors on late-issued patents, allowing 
reference biologics to continually assert new, late-issued patents to stymie the 
entry of biosimilars.30 This, they conclude, violates the antitrust maxims laid 
out in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
that refusal-to-deal antitrust claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act within a regu-
lated industry should turn on “the existence of a regulatory structure designed 
to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm.”31 
The merits of this analogy to Trinko notwithstanding,32 Carrier and Min-
niti’s article went to press prior to two significant court decisions likely to tem-
per the authors’ concerns. The first is Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., a Supreme 
Court decision in June 2017 that will likely limit the availability of the injunc-
tions complained of by Carrier and Minniti.33 In Sandoz, the Court confronted 
two issues in interpreting the BPCIA: (1) whether a biosimilar applicant must 
provide its application and manufacturing information to the reference biologic; 
 
 29. Id. at 38. 
 30. Id. at 39–40. 
 31. 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004); see also Carrier & Minniti, supra note 1, at 44–48. 
 32.  In the section of their article assessing submarine patenting under Trinko, Carrier and Minniti do not 
make clear that the Trinko antitrust plaintiff failed in its attempt to lodge a § 2 Sherman Act claim against re-
fusal-to-deal conduct. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 (“[W]e do not believe that traditional antitrust principles justify 
adding the present case to the few existing exceptions from the proposition that there is no duty to aid competi-
tors.”). Rather, they argue that Trinko’s framework, despite its holding, should compel the opposite conclusion 
in the BPCIA submarine patenting case. Carrier & Minniti, supra note 1, at 44–48. This is not altogether 
clear—or persuasive—from my reading of Trinko. At the same time, in later sections of their article, such as 
Section III.D on REMS abuses, Carrier and Minniti demonstrate a variety of later, lower court cases doing just 
that, such as Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc. and Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Celgene Corp. 
Id. at 50–51. To the extent submarine patenting and REMS abuses are similar, it is analogies to these cases—
not Trinko—that appear to be more persuasive. 
 33.  137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017). 
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and (2) whether a biosimilar applicant can provide its notice of commercial 
marketing prior to approval by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).34 
In assessing the first issue, the Court unanimously answered no: a biosimilar 
applicant need not provide its application and manufacturing information to the 
reference biologic, despite the BPCIA’s strictures.35 The reason? Because the 
statute also provides an exclusive remedy to the reference biologic for the bio-
similar’s failure: the ability to immediately file a declaratory judgment against 
the biosimilar for the infringement “of any patent that claims the biological 
product or a use of the biological product.”36 Regarding the second issue, the 
Court unanimously answered yes: A biosimilar applicant may provide its notice 
of commercial marketing to the reference biologic prior to FDA approval—thus 
similarly triggering a reference biologic’s declaratory judgment suit against the 
biosimilar applicant.37 This, according to the Court, was dictated by the plain 
language of the BPCIA.38 
The benefit of this ruling is that biosimilars, rather than reference biolog-
ics, are now largely in control of the contours of BPCIA litigation against them. 
Bio-similars can essentially decide whether to engage in the BPCIA’s patent 
dance at all, with the provision that their failure to do so—either in whole or in 
part—will almost certainly result in a declaratory judgment by the reference 
biologic.39 During the course of that litigation, the biosimilar would almost cer-
tainly be required to disclose the application and manufacturing information it 
had previously withheld and, in parallel, obtain through discovery a list of all 
patents the reference biologic considers infringed by biosimilar’s proposed 
product.40 That discovery would also be sure to include a list of any currently 
prosecuted or recently transferred patent applications—the submarine patents 
that concern Carrier and Minniti.41 Further, because the declaratory judgment 
action is the exclusive remedy for the biosimilar’s failure to initially provide its 
marketing information under the BPCIA, it does not appear that a reference bi-
ologic would be able to obtain a revolving series of preliminary injunctions 
against the biosimilar based on newly issued patents. Rather, the Sandoz Court 
implied that such injunctions would only be proper under 35 U.S.C. 
 
 34. Id. at 1669. 
 35. Id. 
 36.  Id. at 1672; see also 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) (2012). 
 37. Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. at 1672. 
 38. See id. at 1678 (“[Amgen’s] arguments could not overcome the statute’s plain language, which is our 
‘primary guide’ to Congress’ preferred policy.”). 
 39.  See id. at 1672 (“Because the applicant (subject to certain constraints) chooses when to begin com-
mercial marketing and when to give notice, it wields substantial control over the timing of the second phase of 
litigation.”). 
 40.  See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev’d in part and vacated in 
part, Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. at 1664 (“Once the [reference biologic] brings an infringement suit under those two 
provisions, it can access the required information through discovery.”). Nonetheless, there appear to be some 
limitations to discovery in the BPCIA context. See Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., 866 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (prohibiting discovery concerning the biosimilar’s cell culture techniques given that Amgen did not list 
its cell culture patents in Phase I litigation and conceded that “the cell-culture manufacturing information is not 
relevant to the currently asserted claims.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 41. Carrier & Minniti, supra note 1, at 40–41. 
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§ 271(e)(4)(B), a subsection governing injunctions “to prevent the commercial 
manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale . . . [of a] biological product.”42 There, 
too, the Sandoz Court noted that biosimilars, not reference biologics, have the 
power to control the timing of the patent suits against them by allowing biosim-
ilars to file their notices of commercial marketing prior to FDA approval.43 In 
either of these cases, any submarine patents held by reference biologics’ would 
be located by biosimilars during discovery, with any preliminary injunctions 
against the biosimilar occurring prior to FDA approval—when the biosimilar 
would not have been able to enter the market in any event. 
These practical implementations of the BPCIA notwithstanding, the Fed-
eral Circuit’s recent decision in Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, also decided after Carrier 
and Minniti’s article went to press, suggest that submarine patents for biologics 
are now even more unlikely.44 Following a jury trial in favor of Amgen, one 
aspect of the Amgen appeal focused on the court’s jury instructions concerning 
written description and enablement, two requirements of patentability.45 Writ-
ten description requires patentees to sufficiently describe, in their patents’ spec-
ifications, a representative scope of their claimed inventions.46 Enablement, 
meanwhile, requires patentees to claim and describe their inventions in such a 
way as to enable a “person having ordinary skill in the art” to make and use the 
inventions without undue experimentation.47 These have long been trouble-
some provisions for patents covering antibodies—the staple molecules of bio-
logics—because antibodies are both chemical complex and functionally defined 
by what molecules they interact with rather than by what they are chemically.48 
To satisfy written description and enablement, antibody patentees have long 
resorted to chemically defining the molecule to which the antibody bound, i.e., 
the antigen, and oftentimes where on the antigen the antibody bound to.49 In 
Amgen’s case, for example, it defined its antibody as “anti-PCSK9,” because it 
bound to certain locations on the protein PCSK9.50 
 
 42.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B) (2012); Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. at 1675 n.2 (“In holding that § 262(l )(9)(C) 
represents the exclusive remedy for an applicant’s failure to provide its application and manufacturing infor-
mation, we express no view on whether a district court could take into account an applicant’s violation of 
§ 262(l )(2)(A) (or any other BPCIA procedural requirement) in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunc-
tion under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B) or § 283 against marketing the biosimilar.”). 
 43.  See Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. at 1672. 
 44.  872 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 45.  Id. 
 46. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[S]ufficient 
description of a genus instead requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within 
the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art 
can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.”). 
 47.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1375. 
 48. Hyeongsu Park, Comment, Written Description Problems of the Monoclonal Antibody Patents after 
Centocor v. Abbott, HARV. J.L. & TECH. DIGEST (Mar. 13, 2014), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/written-
description-problems-of-the-monoclonal-antibody-patents-after-centocor-v-abbott (recounting the recent histo-
ry of these difficulties). 
 49.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1375–79 (reviewing cases). 
 50. Id. at 1371–72. 
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Despite decades of practice, the Federal Circuit concluded this was no 
longer enough, and jury instructions to that effect were given in error.51 Rather, 
the Federal Circuit concluded that defining antibodies by their antigens—even 
if done with specificity—“ran afoul of what is perhaps the core ruling” of writ-
ten description.52 Adequate written description must contain “a precise defini-
tion” of the thing claimed, and where the patent’s claims are directed to a genus 
of chemicals—as with functionally defined antibodies—the specification must 
detail “properties . . . of [the] species falling within the genus sufficient to dis-
tinguish the genus from other materials.”53 In the biologics context, this means 
that referencing the antigen to which an antibody binds is not enough: 
“[I]nstead of ‘analogizing the antibody-antigen relationship to a ‘key in a lock,’ 
it was more apt to analogize it to a lock and ‘a ring with a million keys on 
it.”’54 
The Amgen decision means, in all practicality, that antibody patents will 
be substantially more difficult to obtain. Patent attorneys seeking protection for 
their clients’ antibodies will now likely be required to disclose the antibodies 
corresponding DNA sequence—a significant narrowing of the scope of anti-
body patents to date.55 Further, follow-on patents to narrowly claimed antibody 
patents will also likely to be more difficult to obtain, given narrow claims to a 
known biologic, variants of that biologic, and new therapeutic uses for it are 
likely to be obvious and, therefore, unpatentable.56 These future restrictions on 
antibody patents, coupled with robust discovery under the BPCIA after Sandoz, 
should soften Carrier and Minniti’s concerns over the anticompetitive use of 
submarine patenting in this area. 
III.  CITIZEN PETITION ABUSE 
Carrier and Minniti also examine the potential of reference biologics to 
stave off market competition through the use of FDA citizen petitions, which 
are requests that FDA revoke a drug’s approval over concerns about the drug’s 
safety or efficacy.57 The topic is one Carrier and Minniti previously explored, 
empirically and at length, in the small-molecule context.58 There, Carrier and 
Minniti found that brand pharmaceuticals filed 92% of a subset of these peti-
tions—even though the FDA granted only 8% of them.59 This low success 
rate—combined with increasing page lengths and brands’ filing multiple peti-
 
 51. Id. at 1379. 
 52.  Id. at 1378. 
 53.  Id. (quoting Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  See id. at 1372 (noting the narrowness of antibody claims that recite specific sequences). 
 56.  See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Anticipation and Obviousness as Possession, 65 EMORY L.J. 987, 
1035–38.(2016) (discussing the obvious-to-try standard in the context of antibodies). 
 57.  Carrier & Minniti, supra note 1, at 55–57. 
 58.  Michal A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and At-Last Denied, 66 AM. 
U. L. REV. 305 (2017). 
 59.  Id. at 308. 
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tions against the same generic rival—strongly flagged brands’ citizen petition 
filings as anticompetitive acts.60 
In Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, Carrier and Minniti extend the-
se findings to biologics to assess—given the differences in regulatory 
schemes—whether similar conduct is likely to occur.61 They “predict that in the 
biologics setting, the proportion of frivolous, anticompetitive [citizen] petitions 
will decrease while those raising legitimate scientific concerns will increase.”62 
Carrier and Minniti ground their prediction in the reality that “biologics are 
complex and unpredictable, implicating legitimate safety and efficacy con-
cerns. . . .	magnified because biosimilars will, at most, be similar (rather than 
identical) to the biologic.”63 As an analogy, Carrier and Minniti use Mylan 
N.V.’s petitions over its EpiPen product, a combination drug-device autoinjec-
tor consisting of an epinephrine preloaded-syringe, and used to treat the onset 
of potentially fatal anaphylaxis.64 After competitors produced generic versions 
of EpiPen, Mylan filed several citizen petitions with the FDA raising, what 
turned out to be, legitimate safety and efficacy concerns over their rivals’ prod-
ucts.65 The generic EpiPens complained of by Mylan had difficulty, routinely 
and without accident, deploying the product’s autoinjector and delivering the 
correct quantity of the epinephrine payload.66 By Carier and Minniti’s account, 
these safety and efficacy troubles concerns stemmed from EpiPen’s complexi-
ty—an analogous concern to biosimilars writ large.67 
Outside of the U.S. regulatory regime, it is unclear whether biosimilars 
really do pose the safety concerns so feared by the FDA. Rather, there is evi-
dence in Europe to the contrary, that European biosimilars are just as safe as 
their biologic-branded counterparts. Europe, unlike the U.S., does not have 
separate “interchangeability” requirements for biosimilar approval: a biosimilar 
may be dispensed upon prescription for a reference biologic, just like generic 
medicines for brand products in the small-molecule context in the U.S.68 As a 
result, Europe has witnessed over the past decade a number of natural experi-
ments concerning the interchangeability of biosimilars with their reference 
products.69 A recent landscape review of these interchangeability studies found 
that, for biosimilar-biologic switches in 11,000 patients, “[m]ost . . .	did not re-
 
 60.  Id. at 341 (“Such a finding raises a question as to whether the petitions were related to safety con-
cerns or whether they were just another tool in the toolkit of ‘lifecycle management,’ less charitably known as 
potentially anticompetitive behavior.”). 
 61. Carrier & Minniti, supra note 1, at 55–63. 
 62.  Id. at 61. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 64. 
 65. See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 58, at 350–51. 
 66. See Carlos A. Camargo et al., Auvi-Q versus EpiPen: Preferences of Adults, Caregivers, and Chil-
dren, 1 J. ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 266, 267 (2013) (discussing some of the practical difficulties in 
an equally responsive generic EpiPen).  
 67. Carrier & Minniti, supra note 1, at 63. 
 68.  Pekka Kurki et al., Interchangeability of Biosimilars: A European Perspective, 31 BIODRUGS 83, 83 
(2017). 
 69. Id. at 84. 
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port any switch-related adverse effects.”70 Tracking such effects through Euro-
pean Public Assessment Reports (EPARs), the authors found serious switching 
events in only two cases: coagulation factor VIII (FVIII) and interferon (IFN)-
β.71 And in both cases, the safety problems arising from switching were scien-
tifically idiosyncratic. Regarding FVIII, patients generally lack tolerance to the 
protein, increasing the likelihood that patients will reject “switched” FVIII bio-
similars due to a natural build-up of an immune response against both the refer-
ence and biosimilar version of the drug.72 Even then, however, some “recent 
clinical studies suggest that the risk of [this response] is not significantly in-
creased upon switching between different coagulation factor products.”73 Re-
garding IFN-β, the biosimilar product was ultimately not comparable to the ref-
erence product: the biosimilar consisted of IFN-β-1a while the reference 
product was IFN-β-1b, “two proteins [with] different amino acid sequences, 
post-translational modification profiles, and administration routes.”74 The lack 
of adverse events from biosimilars led the authors to conclude that “the poten-
tial risks [of switches] have been exaggerated.”75 
Given this scientific reality—and manufacturers’ past behavior in the 
small-molecule context—there is little reason to believe that citizen petitions in 
the biologics context would not be anticompetitive. To the contrary, reference 
biologics may use the specter of scientific complexity to exaggerate the safety 
or efficacy concerns of competing biosimilars. Also, given the market for bio-
logics, developers would have every incentive to do so. At the same time, safe-
ty concerns surrounding biosimilars cannot be completely discounted as 
evinced by the FVIII and IFN-β. But given their particularity, validating such 
claims would be extraordinarily difficult. This is likely to require FDA to de-
vote even more of its dwindling resources to assessing such claims, separating 
legitimate risks from merely perceived ones due to the products’ complexity. 
These perceived risks raise concerns that citizen petitions, even in the biologics 
context, may decrease legitimate market competition. 
At the same time, Carrier and Minniti’s prior work on citizen petitions 
provides some guidance as to what are likely to be anticompetitive uses of such 
petitions, at least at a surface level. Carrier and Minniti note that the filing of 
multiple citizen petitions soon before patent expiration raises a serious likeli-
hood of anticompetitive conduct.76 Given reference biologics’ robust patent 
portfolios covering their products, the analogy is an imperfect one. But it can 
nonetheless be extended to patents covering the biologic drug product itself—
the antibody composition, for example—rather than methods of use or manu-
facture. Oppositely, reference biologic-filed citizen petitions grounded in ad-
verse event data from elsewhere—like EPARs—should be afforded more 
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weight because such studies were not performed with the purpose of stymying 
competition in the U.S. 
The science of biologics—and the stakes involved for competitors—
provides some caution to Carrier and Minniti’s otherwise hopeful conclusions 
about citizen petitions. But the authors also provide a roadmap for assessing 
our own skepticism. One can hope the authors are right about the latter and 
wrong about the former. 
CONCLUSION 
Carrier and Minniti’s article, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, pro-
vides an extensive and useful discussion of extending the variety of antitrust 
concerns in small-molecule drug litigation to biologics. But its most interesting 
contribution is its linkage of antitrust law to the scientific complexity of the un-
derlying products—that biologics’ complexity makes conduct anticompetitive 
in some instances but not others. In their article, Carrier and Minniti may not 
take this insight far enough, at least as concerning reverse payment settlements, 
submarine patents, and citizen petitions. Only future litigation will tell. For 
now, Carrier and Minniti’s excellent work will likely require practitioners, 
scholars, and policy-makers to confront the intersection of antitrust and scien-
tific complexity—the science of substitution. 
 
